This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated composite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.
Introduction
Today, strategic alliances are increasingly and widely used by firms in networkoriented industries such as airline, shipping, multimodal transport, telecommunications, and logistics industries, as well as firms in non-network markets of compatible components such as personal computers and software, AT M s and bankcards, and markets for vacations comprising of airline transportation and resort hotel stay. One common feature of these markets is that multiple firms produce competing and/or complementary products. This feature raises an interesting managerial question of who is the best partner for an alliance. Furthermore, as these firms act independently, the well-known concept of vertical and/or horizontal externalities exist in the markets. Then, the partner choice by firms, which consequently leads to different types of alliances, causes different impacts on welfare. Therefore, the partner choices for strategic alliances also raise welfare concerns.
This study investigates the partner choices for strategic alliances in composite good markets, from both a positive and a normative perspective. We consider a simple but common market including a representative consumer and three firms. The consumer purchases a composite good offered solely by one composite goods firm, and another differentiated composite good comprising of two components, each produced by one components producer. 1 We examine the consequences of an alliance between the two complementary components producers and the alliance between one components producer and the composite goods firm. The former is characterized as a complementary alliance, and the latter as a parallel alliance. In particular, we argue whether or not one components producer should ally with another components producer (its complementary partner), or ally with the composite goods firm (its rival that produces a substitutive composite good), to derive a comparatively larger profit. We explicitly include a profit sharing negotiation by considering Nash bargaining solutions.
First, we find that a complementary alliance may be unprofitable, whereas a parallel alliance is always profitable for the allied firms. As Cournot (1838) pointed out, if there is no rival composite goods firm in the market, a complementary alliance between two complementary components producers corrects for a vertical externality by jointly pricing, and thus, it increases their profits. This is well known as the double marginalization problem in vertically related markets. However, if there is a rival firm, the correction for the vertical externality also has an adverse effect by enhancing the price competition between the two composite goods. When the two goods are less differentiated (i.e., the competition is substantial), this adverse effect makes the complementary alliance unprofitable. On the other hand, the parallel alliance is always profitable because it relaxes competition against the rival product by correcting horizontal externalities.
Further, we find that the joint profits obtained by the parallel alliance are always larger than those obtained by the complementary alliance. However, total profitability alone is not a sufficient determinant of the type of alliance that will emerge. Through the standard approach of Nash bargaining, we find that when the degree of product differentiation for the two composite goods is sufficiently large (small), a components producer prefers the alliance with its complementary partner (the composite goods firm). This results from the fact that the bargaining position of each firm is different, depending on which firm it allies with and on market conditions. In particular, if a components producer allies with its complementary partner, they bargain for the joint profits on an equal footing and independently of the degree of product differentiation. Alternatively, if the components producer allies with the composite goods firm (its rival), the components producer's bargaining position (or profit on the threat point) is weaker than its rival's, and this disadvantage becomes larger as the degree of product differentiation becomes substantial. In other words, the components producer may prefer a type of alliance that yields a lower total profit but a higher share for itself when the degree of product differentiation is significant.
Our findings on the preference for an alliance partner provide clear managerial implications. In short, for the composite goods firm, allying with a component producer is always profitable. For a component producer, it is sensible to ally with its complementary partner if the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large; otherwise, allying with its rival, the composite goods firm, is preferable.
Furthermore, because the complementary alliance leads to lower prices by both eliminating double marginalization and intensifying competition, it is welfareenhancing. However, the parallel alliance is welfare-decreasing because it relaxes competition. Combining these results, our findings on firms' alliance partner choices also offer important implications for competition policies, such as the antitrust policy. First, when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large, a regulatory policy concerning the alliance formation might not be necessary because the welfare-enhancing complementary alliance will be spontaneously formed. Second, when the degree of product differentiation is intermediate, interestingly, the prohibition of forming a parallel alliance can encourage components producers to form a complementary alliance. Finally, when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently small, the prohibition of forming a parallel alliance can prevent welfare reduction. However, this alone cannot encourage the formation of a complementary alliance due to its non-profitability. In this case, an additional policy (e.g., subsidy policy) for implementing the complementary alliance can also be socially desirable.
These clear implications are meaningful for antitrust policymakers and practitioners. As a concrete example of the airline industry, China Airlines and Delta operate international flights between Taipei and Los Angeles, while Delta and US Airways operate domestic flights between Los Angeles and Las Veg a s . Taipei-Las Veg a s travelers may prefer to either use Delta's flights for the entire trip or connect China Airlines' and US airways' flights; therefore the single airline flight and interline connecting flights may be considered as differentiated substitutes. 2 In practice, China Airlines is the code-share alliance partner of Delta for the Los Angeles-Taipei route. As expressed in the context of our study, China Airlines has selected Delta as its partner to form a parallel alliance. Ignoring other complexities, our finding implies that if the Taipei-Las Veg a s passengers differentiate between the two connecting services to a certain degree, 3 then prohibiting Delta and China Airlines from setting prices as a single airline (e.g., ruling out antitrust immunity by the International Air Transport Association, IATA) may persuade China Airlines to form a complementary alliance with US Airways, which is welfare-enhancing. 4 A number of previous studies have considered strategic alliances in composite good markets where there are both vertical and horizontal externalities. The studies that focused on the complementary alliance have been provided by Beggs (1994) , Lin (2004) , Zhang and Zhang (2006) , among others. The studies dealing with parallel alliances in airline networks include Brueckner (2001) , Shy (2001, Ch.9) , and Lin (2005) and . However, each of the previous studies assumed that the alliance partners are exogenously decided and the share rate of the joint profits between the allied partners is taken as given. Unlike these previous studies, the present study explicitly investigates the issue of partner choice, and considers the corresponding joint profits sharing problem by introducing the Nash-bargaining process. 5 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the market structure and derive the equilibrium in the benchmark case (i.e., the case without an alliance). We then proceed to derive the outcomes of a complementary and a parallel alliance, respectively, with the Nash-bargaining solutions. In Section 3, we examine the effects of the two types of alliances and the alliance partner preference for each firm. We then provide a welfare comparison. In Section 4, we extend our analysis to consider a taste variety generated by the existence of heterogeneous consumers and to consider asymmetric bargaining power among firms. We conclude our analysis in Section 5.
The Model
Consider a market with two differentiated composite goods. Firm 1 provides a composite good, composed of components A and B, at a single price p 1 . Firm 2 (3) provides component A (B) at price p 2 (p 3 ). 6 Because we are concerned about strategic alliances in a composite goods market, the markets for component A or B individually are not included in our model. 7 Following Economides and Salop (1992) , the marginal costs for each firm are constant and assumed to be zero. 8 Consumers of composite goods can either purchase the composite good (good 1) provided by firm 1, or combine the two components in a fixed proportion (one unit of each) to form a composite good (good 23). The utility of a representative consumer is defined by the following standard quadratic utility function:
where q 1 and q 23 , respectively, represent the demand for the two differentiated composite goods. Parameter a > 0, and the condition for the concavity of the function is 0 < b < 1. 9
6 Our model also applies to the case where firm 1's composite good is one single product, as well as to the case where its composite good is combined from several components.
7 As Zhang and Zhang (2006) indicate that alliance firms can remain separate business entities and retain their decision-making autonomy under strategic alliances, our assumption can be justified in a situation where firms can use discriminating price strategies for each single component market. Under discriminating price strategies, the alliance partners can cooperatively set a total price for the composite goods, while retaining separate decision-making in their own single component market. For these strategies in airline network markets, see Brueckner (2001) , Lin (2004) and (2008) among others. 8 The results are identical for positive constant marginal costs with "price" reinterpreted as the difference between price and marginal cost. 9 This type of utility function has been used in a number of differentiated duopoly studies (e.g., Spence (1976) , Dixit (1979) , Vives (1984) and (1985) , Sutton (1997) , Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) , among others).
The consumer surplus is measured by
Note that good 23 is available at total price (p 2 + p 3 ) . Given the prices, the representative consumer chooses the quantity that maximizes his/her consumer surplus. The demand functions for the two composite goods can be derived and written as follows: 10
Parameter b can be used as an index of product differentiation. When parameter b is close to zero (unity), the cross-price effect is extremely small (sufficiently large), which implies that the two differentiated composite goods are almost independent (perfect substitutes). Notice that the demand for composite good 23 here is assumed to be the same size as the demand for composite good 1. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.
Equilibrium of the Independent Case (No Alliance)
We derive the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for the benchmark case (Case-I) where no alliance is formed and each firm independently sets the price of its own product. The profit function for firm 1 can be defined as π 1 = p 1 ·q 1 (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ;b), and the profit function for firm i (i = 2,3) is defined as π i = p i ·q 23 (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ;b). Each firm chooses a price that maximizes its own profits, taking the prices of the other firms as given. Then, the profit-maximization of each firm is respectively characterized by the following first-order conditions:
These first-order conditions, which are indeed the reaction functions for the firms, describe the strategic complementarity and substitutability relationship among the three firms. 11 The composite good of firm 1 and the composite good composed of the components of firms 2 and 3 are substitutes. Thus, p 1 and p 2 (as well as p 3 ) are strategic complements. On the other hand, because the components of firms 2 and 3 are complements, p 2 and p 3 are strategic substitutes. Note that the two components producers are symmetric in our model. 10 Although the derived demand functions are linear, it yields a number of suggestive conclusions that are likely to hold true in general (Varian 1992, p. 294) .
11 For the definition of strategic substitutes and complements, Bulow et al. (1985) is useful. 
Case-C: Complementary alliance (firm 2 allies with firm 3)
Case-P: Parallel alliance (firm 2 allies with firm 1)
Solving the equation system (2)- (3), we obtain the outcome of Case-I shown in Table 1 . The superscript "I" stands for the corresponding equilibrium values.
Complementary Alliance and Nash Bargaining over the Gains
We consider the case of a complementary alliance (Case-C) where firm 2 forms an alliance with its complementary partner (firm 3) to compete with their rival (firm 1), by cooperatively setting a total price for their composite good 23. It is assumed that a single decision-maker chooses a total price for composite good 23 (denoted by p 23 ) to maximize the allied firms' joint profits (denoted by π 23 ), and then these joint profits will be shared through Nash bargaining. In Case-C, the demand functions change to
Correspondingly, the profit function of firm 1 becomes π 1 = p 1 ·q 1 (p 1 , p 23 ;b), and the joint profits of the allied firms can be written as π 23 = p 23 ·q 23 (p 1 , p 23 ;b). In Case-C, there exists only the strategic complementarity relationship between firm 1 and the allied firms. Similarly, solving the profit-maximization problems for the two agents in their price setting, we obtain the outcome of the complementary alliance case shown in Table 1 (Case-C). The superscript "C" stands for the corresponding equilibrium values. Now, we turn to solving the Nash bargaining problem for the allied firms. We assume a one-time-only alliance negotiation, which means that each firm has only one chance to negotiate with other firms (i.e., one firm). This could be justified by considering a situation where each firm does not have enough opportunity for bargaining because, for example, the deadline for reaching an agreement is approaching or there are some business practices which restrict free negotiation with different firms. 12 Therefore, the disagreement (threat) point of the bargaining problem is defined as the profits of firms 2 and 3 obtained in Case I, that is (π I 2 ,π I 3 ). In Case-C, firm 2's share π C 2 and firm 3's share π C 3 of the joint profits (the Nash bargaining solution) can be derived and shown as follows: 13
Due to the symmetry between firms 2 and 3, each firm obtains an equal share of the joint profits (i.e., π C 23 /2) through the bargaining. 14
Parallel Alliance and Nash Bargaining over the Gains
We turn to the case of a parallel alliance (Case-P). In Case-P, firm 2 allies with its rival (firm 1), and a single decision-maker chooses the price of composite good 1 as 12 The assumption of one-time-only negotiation excludes the possibility of the following recurrence problem: when bargaining an alliance with firm 3, the threat point of firm 2 may be its profit from an alliance with firm 1, rather than its profit from staying independent. However, the profit from the parallel alliance with firm 1, as derived later, also depends upon firm 2's bargaining power, which in turn, depends upon its bargaining position against firm 3. In other words, the threat point in forming a complementary alliance depends on the threat point when bargaining the parallel alliance, which in turn, depends on the threat point when bargaining the complementary alliance, and so forth. Our assumption enables us to avoid the recurrence problem concerning a threat point of bargaining.
13 Deriving the Nash bargaining solution follows the Split-The-Difference Rule of a Nash bargaining problem (See Nash (1950) and Muthoo (1999) ). It can be derived by solving the following maximization problem: max
2 , π 3 ≥π I 3 } is the set of possible profit pairs obtainable through agreement. 14 It is assumed that the relative degree of impatience and risk aversion of each firm is identical, implying that the allied firms equally split the gains from alliance. Thus, the difference in the bargaining position between the allied firms comes only from the location of the disagreement point. This assumption applies to the parallel alliance case. Section 4.2 considers the asymmetric bargaining power.
well as the price of component A, to maximize their joint profits denoted by π 12 . 15 In this case, the demand functions remain the same as in (1). The profit function for the unallied firm (firm 3) does not change, and its first-order condition for profitmaximization is still represented by (3). The joint profits of the allied firms can be written as π 12 = p 1 ·q 1 (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ;b)+p 2 ·q 23 (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ;b), and the corresponding first-order conditions are:
(6) The aforementioned strategic complementarity and substitutability relationships between the allied firms and the unallied firm in Case-P are also reflected in (6). Solving these three equations, we have the Bertrand-Nash outcome of the parallel alliance case shown in Table 1 (Case-P). The superscript "P" stands for the corresponding equilibrium values.
It should be noted that as the two allied firms will continue to offer component A at a reasonable price (p 2 ), consumers can continue to choose the composite good 23. It may be considered that once firm 2 allies with firm 1, it will refuse to offer component A (i.e., to force composite good 23 out of the market) so as to ensure its monopoly position for composite good 1. However, it is more profitable for the parallel alliance to continue offering component A for composite good 23. 16 The outsider, firm 3, still earns positive profits π P 3 > 0 as shown in Table 1 . These results come from one major feature of the love of variety utility function. Now, we solve the Nash bargaining problem for Case-P. The disagreement point of the bargaining problem in this case is (π I 1 ,π I 2 ). Firm 1's share π P 1 and firm 2's share π P 2 of the joint profits (Nash bargaining solution) can be derived and shown as follows: 17
15 Given the symmetry between firms 2 and 3, the other parallel alliance case (i.e., an alliance between firms 1 and 3) need not be considered explicitly. 16 In detail, if the allied firms choose not to provide component A for composite good 23, they set the monopoly price for composite good 1 (see Table 1 , p P 1 = a/2) and obtain the monopoly profits
This implies that, under the parallel alliance, it is more profitable for the allied firms to continue offering component A for composite good 23 than to shut down the business of component A. 17 Similar to Case-C, the Nash bargaining solution can be derived by solving the following maximization problem: max
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Note that firms 1 and 2 obtain an unequal share of the joint profits through Nash bargaining. This is due to the asymmetry of the profits at the disagreement point between firms 1 and 2 (i.e., π I 1 = π I 2 ), and it plays a critical role in leading to our main results. 18
Effects of the Two Types of Alliances
This subsection examines the effects of the two different types of alliances. These analyses are useful for an understanding of our main argument of the firms' preferences for an alliance partner in Section 3.
The effects of the complementary alliance on market performance can be shown by comparing the outcomes of Case-C with Case-I in Table 1 . From the table, we have the following comparison result:
It can be shown that (9) is positive (negative) when b <b (b >b), whereb≡ √ 2− √ 2 ≈ 0.77. All the other comparisons have also been done by the authors, and only the comparison results are shown in Table 2 for brevity. According to Table 2 , we have the following lemma. The intuition behind the lemma is as follows: Due to the internalization of the vertical externality, the complementary alliance reduces the total price of good 23, and thus forces their rival (firm 1) to lower its composite good's price. In other words, the complementary alliance enhances the price competition between 18 It is possible to expect that the outside firm blocks an alliance, for example, by promising to give an allied (inside) firm a larger share of joint profits if the allied firm dissolves the partnership and allies with the outside firm. This possibility is excluded in our study by the assumption of one-time-only negotiation. Comparison between equilibria of Case-C and Case-I
Comparison between equilibria of Case-P and Case-I
two composite goods, and this causes a decrease in the allied firms' joint profits. When the price competition is not substantial (i.e., parameter b is small), the gains accrued by the internalization outweigh the losses due to the price competition, and hence, the allied firms' joint profits increase. However, when the price competition is substantial (i.e., parameter b is sufficiently large), the losses outweigh the gains, and hence, the joint profits of the allied firms decrease. This is in contrast to the usual result that complementary alliance generally increases the allied firms' joint profits (Spengler (1950) , Tirole (1988, Ch.4) ). Similarly, we compare the outcomes of Case-P with Case-I in Table 1 , to investigate the effects of the parallel alliance. From Table 1 , we have the following comparison result:
Note that the other comparison results are listed in Table 2 . Here, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The parallel alliance between firms 1 and 2 (a) increases the price of the composite good 1. It also increases the price of firm 2's component and reduces the price of the unallied firm 3's component. Corresponding to the price changes, both the equilibrium outputs of the two composite goods decrease. (b) increases the joint profits of the two allied firms, while it reduces the profits of the unallied firm.
In contrast to the result that the complementary alliance may reduce the allied firms' joint profits (Lemma 1-(b)), the parallel alliance always increases the allied firms' joint profits. This is because the horizontal externality, which exists between firms 1 and 2, is internalized by cooperative pricing under the parallel alliance, and the allied firms now have room to raise their prices p 1 and p 2 . On the other hand, this strategic pricing forces the unallied firm (firm 3) to lower its price. Thus, price changes like those in Lemma 2 emerge, and the corresponding changes in outputs and profits can be obtained.
We further examine the relationship between the allied firms' joint profits in the two different alliances. From Table 1 , we have
Lemma 3 The allied firms' joint profits from the parallel alliance are always larger than those from the complementary alliance.
Lemma 3 simply indicates that the joint profits which can be shared between the parallel alliance partners (i.e., firms 1 and 2) are always larger than the joint profits which can be shared between the complementary alliance partners (i.e., firms 2 and 3).
3 Partner Choice and Welfare
Preference for Alliance Partners
We discuss each firm's preference for an alliance partner. According to (7) and Table 1 , we have the relationship for firm 1's profits as π P 1 > π I 1 , which implies that firm 1 certainly prefers allying with firm 2 (or equivalently with firm 3) to acting independently. Now, we discuss firm 2's preference for an alliance partner. From (5), (8) and Table 1 , we have the following relationships of firm 2's profits:
Eq. (11) has the same sign condition as (9), which is determined by the defined valueb. While (13) cannot be unambiguously signed, numerical calculations show
Degree of product homogeneity b In Figure 1 , the value of parameter b is shown on the horizontal axis. The values of (5) and (8) are shown by the downward line noted by π C 2 and the U-shaped line noted by π P 2 , respectively. According to Figure 1 , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (a) π C 2 is decreasing in parameter b, (b) π P 2 is decreasing (increasing) in parameter b when b is small (large).
Proof: From (5) and (8), we have
It is obvious that (15) is negative (positive) when b is small (large). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4-(a) holds because a larger b implies that price competition is substantial and this leads to a decrease in the joint profits which can be shared between firms 2 and 3. To understand the intuition of Lemma 4-(b), we derive
Eq. (16) describes that the difference in bargaining position (threat point) between firms 1 and 2, which coincides with the difference between π I 1 and π I 2 , becomes smaller, if b becomes larger. Thus for firm 2, the disadvantage of its bargaining position can be weakened, as b becomes larger. This turns into a positive effect on firm 2's profits. On the other hand, (17) indicates that the joint profits, which should be shared between firms 1 and 2, become smaller, if price competition is substantial, and this causes a negative effect on firm 2's profits. Then, Lemma 4-(b) holds due to the relationship between the positive and negative effects.
From the above lemmas, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a market where one single composite goods firm competes with two components producers (each provides the component that is necessary for forming a substitutive composite good), (a) when 0 < b <b ≈ 0.29, a components producer prefers the alliance with its complementary partner, to the alliance with its rival (the composite goods firm). (b) whenb < b < 1, a components producer prefers the alliance with its rival, to the alliance with its complementary partner.
Although the parallel alliance yields larger joint profits (Lemma 3), the components producers might still prefer a complementary alliance. For firm 2, larger (smaller) joint profits in the parallel (complementary) alliance do not necessarily guarantee that it will obtain comparatively larger (smaller) gains through bargaining with its alliance partner. This is because the bargaining position of its partner is varied, depending on which firm it allies with and on the market conditions. In particular, although the joint profits in the complementary alliance are comparatively small, firm 2 can equally share it with its partner (firm 3). In contrast to the complementary alliance, although the joint profits of the parallel alliance are comparatively large, firm 2 cannot equally share it with its partner (firm 1), which has a superior bargaining position. Figure 2 helps us understand Propositions 1-(a) and -(b). In the figure, the disagreement point for the complementary (parallel) alliance is noted by d C (d P ). Corresponding to π P 12 > π C 23 , the frontier of the joint profits of the parallel alliance (noted by the line π P 12 ) is located farther from the original point than that of the complementary alliance (noted by the line π C 23 ). In addition, as parameter b becomes larger, the disagreement point is located closer to the original point, and 
Welfare and Policies for Alliance Formations
We compare the social welfare of the three cases, and then discuss the policy implications for alliance formation. Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumers' and producers' surplus. According to Table 1, social welfare in each case can be derived and written as
Here, we have W C > W I > W P for all b ∈ (0,1), which can be shown in the lower panel of Figure 3 . The welfare ranking is intuitive because the prices of both composite goods in Case-C are lower, while the prices in Case-P are higher than those 19 It can be confirmed that
Figure 3: Firm's Preferences and Social Welfare in Case-I. In other words, the complementary alliance is welfare-enhancing, while the parallel alliance is welfare-reducing, compared to the welfare under no-alliance. However, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 3 , the firms do not always prefer to form the welfare-enhancing complementary alliance. We consider two types of policy intervention: prohibiting and subsidizing some types of alliance formation. We assume that the subsidy payments are financed by non-distortionary consumer taxation (such as lump-sum taxes on consumers) and the enforcement costs of both policies can be neglected. Combining the welfare rankings and the firms' preference for alliance formation yields the following proposition. Proposition 2 has interesting policy implications for alliance formation in a composite goods market. When the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (region I in Figure 3) , government interventions are not necessary because a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance will be spontaneously formed. When the degree of product differentiation is intermediate (region II), it is socially desirable to prohibit a welfare-reducing parallel alliance. More significantly, this regulation of the parallel alliance can encourage the two component firms to form a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance. When the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently small (region III), prohibiting a parallel alliance can prevent welfare reduction, but that alone cannot effectively encourage the two component firms to form a complementary alliance because it is not profitable for them (see Lemma 1-(b)). Thus, in this case, an additional policy (e.g., a subsidy policy financed by consumer taxation) for implementing the complementary alliance can also be socially desirable.
Extensions
In this section, we extend the model by considering the existence of two important factors: asymmetric market size (i.e., asymmetric scale of demand) for the two composite goods and asymmetric bargaining power among firms.
Asymmetric Market Size
In order to introduce the factor of asymmetric market size, which can serve as a proxy for the factor of a variety of consumer tastes, we modify the utility function in our present model as follows:
The added parameter s represents the difference in the benefits derived from the consumption of two composite goods. A relatively larger benefit leads to a larger scale of demand for the composite good. Therefore, s = 1 coincides with the case of the symmetric market size investigated in the previous sections. If s > 1 (s < 1), then the market size of composite good 23 is larger (smaller) than that of composite good 1. Such an asymmetric market size can be interpreted as representing differences in consumer tastes for the two composite goods. Specifically, the case of s > 1 (s < 1) could represent a situation where more (fewer) consumers prefer good 23 to good 1. 20 This extension increases the richness of our model by accounting for not only horizontal but also vertical differentiation between the two composite goods.
For this utility specification, we obtain the following demand functions of the two composite goods:
In order to ensure positive demand for both composite goods, we assume s ∈ (b, 1 b ). After some tedious mathematical derivations, we obtain the equilibrium values in our three cases I, C, and P, as shown in Table 3 .
We investigate the profitability of the two types of alliances. Whether the complementary alliance is profitable is given bŷ
The profitability condition of the complementary alliance is identical to that in the case of symmetric market size (eq. (9)). Whether the parallel alliance is profitable is given bŷ
where the sign follows from the assumption that s ∈ (b, 1 b ). Thus, we find that the formation of a parallel alliance is necessarily profitable for the allied firms. The comparison of the joint profits between the two types of alliances is given bŷ
. 20 This asymmetry can be considered to be caused by the different degree of compatibility between the two goods. For discussions on this issue, see Matutes and Regibeau (1988) , Economides (1989) , and Economides and Salop (1992) . It is also noteworthy that it seems natural to consider s < 1 because good 23 is comprised of two different firms' components. However, it also makes sense to consider the case of s > 1. Kawasaki (2008) , a study that relates well with our example of airline alliances (in Section 1), showed an interesting case that, as compared with using a single airline's flights, some passengers could obtain a relatively larger benefit by using interline connecting flights due to greater frequencies on each direct flight (i.e., each component) they used. 
Shared profits after Nash bargaining: Next, we investigate firm 2's preference for an alliance partner. From Table  3 , we obtainπ
where
The shared profits of firm 2 resulting from a complementary alliance are larger (smaller) than those resulting from a parallel alliance in the area located at the left (right) side of curve β (b) in Figure 4 . The larger the value of s, the more likely that firm 2 has an incentive to form a complementary alliance with firm 3. Correspondingly, the critical value ofb in Figure 1 moves to the right (left) as s becomes greater (smaller) than unity. Ĉ onsidering these findings together, the profitability of the two types of alliances can be separated into four regions in Figure 4 . In regions i and iv, firm 2 prefers forming an alliance that yields relatively larger total joint profits. However, in regions ii and iii, firm 2 actually prefers forming an alliance that yields relatively smaller joint profits.
Finally, we investigate the welfare consequences of the two types of alliances. In the case of an asymmetric market size, the equilibrium welfare in cases I, C, and P, respectively, is
We havêŴ Figure 5 , γ(b) is illustrated by curve γ(b). The welfare ranking isˆW C > W I >ˆW P in the area above curve γ(b) (i.e., regions I, II, and III) while the ranking isˆW I >ˆW C >ˆW P in the area below curve γ(b) (i.e., regions IV and V). Forming a complementary alliance necessarily leads to a decrease in the prices of both composite goods, and thus increases consumer surplus. In a case in which s is small and b is large, as shown in regions IV and V, it leads to a decrease in the sum of industry profits, which may dominate the positive effects on consumer surplus. 22 In such a 22 Specifically, CS I < CS C necessarily holds for all s Given the defined β (b), γ(b), and the value ofb, Figure 5 shows the firms' preferences for partner choices and the relative welfare ranking. The vertical line labeled byb represents the critical value in eq. (18). Then, the same arguments for policy implications under Proposition 2 (that stated in regions I, II, and III in Figure 3 ) apply to regions I, II, and III in Figure 5 as well. In regions IV and V, a parallel alliance is formed but an independent ownership is socially desirable. Therefore, in region IV, where firm 2's preference is P 2 C 2 I, the government should prohibit the formation of both types of alliances. However, in region V, it should only prohibit the formation of a parallel alliance because P 2 I 2 C.
Asymmetric Bargaining Power
Propositions 1 and 2 are critically dependent on the process of Nash bargaining. In the case of the complementary alliance, a symmetry argument could justify the equal sharing. However, in the case of the parallel alliance, there may be asymmetric bargaining power (as well as asymmetric bargaining position) between firms 1 and 2.
In the case of asymmetric bargaining power, the Nash bargaining process of forming a parallel alliance can be described by
where Γ≡{(π 1 ,π 2 ) : π 1 +π 2 ≤π P 12 , π 1 ≥π I 1 , π 2 ≥π I 2 }. In this bargaining problem, σ ∈ [0,1] represents the bargaining power of firm 1. This modification affects the value ofb and thus Proposition 1. The trivial calculation shows that when σ approaches unity, firm 2's share of joint profit in the parallel alliance approaches its profit in the independent case (π I 2 ), and thusb also approaches tob. Conversely, the smaller the value of σ , the smallerb and firm 2 is more likely to prefer the parallel alliance.
The difference of the bargaining power in the parallel alliance also affects the welfare implication of policy interventions (Proposition 2). The derived value of social welfare is independent of the value of σ because σ does not affect the price of goods or components, but only affects the profit sharing between firms 1 and 2. Therefore, we can state that as the composite goods firm (firm 1) has greater bargaining power against its rival components producer, the welfare-enhancing complementary alliance is more likely to emerge under Laissez-Faire.
Concluding Remarks
This study investigated the issue of alliance partner choice in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. In the market, a particular firm has two partners to choose for forming an alliance: one is its complementary partner who produces a complementary component; the other is its rival who produces substitutive (composite) goods. We first found that the corresponding joint profits obtained by the latter alliance are always larger than those obtained by the former alliance. Through the Nash bargaining approach, we further found that it is always profitable for the composite goods firm to form an alliance with a component producer. On the other hand, when the degree of product differentiation for the two composite goods is sufficiently large, although the parallel alliance yields larger joint profits, the components producers might still prefer a complementary alliance. These findings provide clear and useful managerial implications for those firms that consider allying with other firms in a composite goods market.
We showed that the complementary alliance is welfare-enhancing, whereas the parallel alliance is welfare-reducing. To encourage a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance, a government can implement the following policies: If the two composite goods are (i) highly differentiated, there is no need for government intervention, (ii) intermediately differentiated, prohibiting a parallel alliance can encourage firms to form a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance, and (iii) slightly differentiated, the prohibition of a parallel alliance may not be sufficient and a subsidy policy for implementing a complementary alliance can be socially desirable. In order to confirm the robustness of these results, we extended the basic model by incorporating two types of heterogeneity into our model: differences in the market size of the two composite goods and differences in the bargaining power among firms. As an application that is consistent with our theoretical model, we also provided one practical example of an airline alliance to illustrate the impact of our findings on antitrust policy.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of this study and suggest some directions for future research. First, cost advantages which may be generated by alliance formations are not considered in our study. We recognize that there are arguments that merged/allied firms may enjoy a cost advantage. 23 Considering the effect of costsaving through alliance formation remains a subject for future research. Second, the present network structure is exogenously given and the number of composite goods producers (components producers) is restricted to one (two). It is meaningful to consider various types of market structure with a larger number of firms.
